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Reputation Matters: Evidence From the Korean War* 
 
 
John Speed Meyers 
 
Both sides in the Korean War calculated their adversary’s military power and diplomatic resolve 
by studying their enemy’s past behavior in addition to their enemy’s current military posture and 
diplomatic actions. Past decisions to yield provided adversaries with private information about how 
leaders perceived their own state’s military power and resolve. Enemies judged a state that recently 
yielded as militarily weak or diplomatically indifferent. The preponderance of evidence suggests that 
leaders should protect their reputation. 
 





Believers and non-believers in reputation can agree on only one position: diplomats and 
leaders focus intently on protecting their state’s reputation. Their world-views then diverge 
dramatically. Non-believers deride the other side as engaged in a “cult of reputation” (Tang, 
2006). Leaders disagree. They are convinced of the connection between their current actions 
and their future credibility. George H.W. Bush, for instance, thought that a decision to forego 
restoring Kuwait’s independence “would be a signal to actual and potential despots around 
the world (New York Times, 1990). Are leaders “needlessly worrying” about their 
reputation? (Mercer, 2013) Or are they rightfully protecting a crucial diplomatic asset? 
This paper argues that leaders are right to give weight to the effect of current decisions on 
their state’s reputation—their actions in previous crises and wars.1 Adversaries learn about 
another state’s military strength and diplomatic resolve by observing past behavior. 
Historical evidence from the Korean War demonstrates that Kim Il-Sung, Joseph Stalin, and 
Harry Truman each believed that their adversary’s past actions revealed private information 
about their enemies’ military prowess and diplomatic interests. Only Mao Zedong did not 
use past American actions in his pre-war assessment of U.S. power and stakes. Leaders 
interpreted past instances of inaction as evidence of military weakness or diplomatic 
indifference.  
The rest of this paper proceeds in five sections. The first section explains the traditional 
importance attached to reputation and the modern, scholarly skepticism. The second section 
summarizes an emerging literature that challenges the academic skeptics, details theoretical 
and methodological objections to the skeptics’ research, advances a theory of reputation that 
identifies past actions as a source of private information, and explains my methodology. The 
third is the empirical section which focuses on the decision-making processes of the North 
Korean, Soviet, Chinese, and American leaders before and during the Korean War. The 
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1 I define reputation as actions by a state in a previous war or crisis. 
 JOHN SPEED MEYERS 20 
 
fourth addresses counter-arguments. The fifth summarizes the evidence and offers advice to 
modern makers of strategy.  
 
 
2. THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM AND ITS SKEPTICS 
 
That statesmen should protect their country’s reputation has been conventional wisdom 
since Thucydides penned The History of the Peloponnesian War. Writing about the events of 
fifth century B.C., Thucydides recounts how Athens, concerned with its reputation, dealt 
with the small island-state of Melos. Athens had requested that Melos pay tribute and submit 
to Athenian rule. When Melos proposed neutrality instead, the Athenians refused. Melian 
neutrality, the Athenian envoy explained, “will be argument to our subjects of our weakness”   
(Thucydides, Strassley, and Crawley, 1996: 352).  
Modern scholars and policy analysts also believe in importance of reputation. Schelling’s 
game-theoretic work set the terms of the modern debate over reputation, establishing its 
theoretical importance and influencing many future scholars and analysts (Schelling, 1960: 
29-30, 36-37, 40). For instance, those who believe in the strategic importance of Taiwan to 
the United States often rest their argument on the significance of Taiwan to America’s 
reputation. These strategists claim that enemies and allies would downgrade America’s 
credibility if the U.S. military did not intervene while China attacked Taiwan (Art, 2008: 
276-276; Gons, 2011: 192-193; Rigger, 2011: 191; Rehman, 2013). 
Though my paper’s theoretical argument and empirical evidence will eventually 
corroborate this conventional wisdom, I must admit that there has been a fly in the reputation 
ointment. Two book-length, qualitative treatments of reputation and international security, 
published by different authors and analyzing different cases, find little support for the 
conventional belief that reputation plays a role in how leaders assess credibility.  
Mercer focuses on a series of pre-World War I crises involving repeated interactions 
between England, France, Russia, Germany, and Austria over nearly identical issues. Mercer 
argues that these cases constitute an “easy test” for any theory of deterrence that emphasizes 
reputation; leaders are most likely to assess credibility based on an enemy’s past actions 
when confronting past enemies over old issues (Mercer, 1996: 11). His search, however, 
bears no evidence that leaders assess credibility based on past actions. Mercer’s findings 
support his theoretical claim that leaders will attribute an enemy’s past decision to back 
down to “situational” factors and not a state’s “disposition.” He therefore claims that 
adversaries who back down do not gain a reputation (Mercer, 1996: 67).   
Press, a self-professed one-time “reputation believer” turned skeptic, scours the records 
of pre-World War II German assessments of French and English credibility, American and 
British assessments of the Soviets during the Berlin crisis, and American assessments of the 
Soviets during the Cuban missile crisis only to come to a surprising conclusion: leaders do 
not calculate their adversary’s credibility by extrapolating past actions into the future (Press, 
2005: vii). Press reasons that leaders “abandon simple heuristics,” e.g. another state’s past 
actions, when “faced with momentous decisions” (Press, 2004: 139). Instead, Press argues 
for “current calculus” theory: decision-makers judge the credibility of an enemy’s threat by 









3. A CRITIQUE OF THE SKEPTICS AND A NEW APPROACH 
 
Was Thucydides wrong? I argue no. And others agree. In fact, there is a small body of 
work that seeks to restore, at least partially, the previous importance attached to reputation 
(Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo, 2015; Henry, 2014). Yarhi-Milo and Weisiger use the Militarized 
Interstate Dispute dataset to test a reputation-based theory of deterrence. Their central 
finding is striking: a state that has yielded in a dispute in the previous year is 2.5 times more 
likely to be challenged in the future than is a country that has not yielded in the past ten years, 
even after controlling for military capabilities, regime type, alliances, and other relevant 
covariates (Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo, 2015: 22). Furthermore, even states not involved in the 
original conflict in which one state backed down become more likely to challenge a state that 
has recently yielded (Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo, 2015: 26). Finally, their findings also suggest 
that states that yield in regards to a given issue, e.g. territorial disputes, are more likely to 
experience future challenges on that same type of issue (Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo, 2015: 26-
27).  
 
3.1 Methodological and Theoretical Limitations of Previous Research  
 
This small resurgence relies on three critiques of the skeptics’ research agenda. Weisiger 
and Yarhi-Milo identified the first and second (Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo, 2015). First, 
previous research on reputation implicitly assumes that leaders ignore past actions when 
assessing the military power or foreign policy interests of an enemy (Weisiger and Yarhi-
Milo, 2015: 8). But why would an adversary choose to ignore this disclosure of private 
information? Yielding in an international crisis provides information to adversaries and allies 
about a state’s self-assessment of military power and the strength of its interests engaged. 
Second, researchers have tended to focus on “crisis” deterrence, the period of elevated 
tensions between two states before or during a larger conflict, neglecting cases where an 
adversary has yet to initiate a crisis. This latter type of case, “general” deterrence, promises 
to be more fruitful in a search for qualitative evidence of reputation’s effect. This is because 
leaders have likely already factored a state’s past actions, or “reputation,” into its assessment 
of that state’s credibility during a crisis (Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo, 2015: 478). Dafoe, 
Renshon and Huth agree that the problem of “unspoken assumptions” complicates a 
researcher’s hunt for evidence of reputation. They argue that “common knowledge” and 
“shared beliefs…are rarely stated outright,” that “the reputation and status of a state are 
likely to be commonly known at the beginning of the crisis,” and that therefore evidence in 
favor reputation’s importance will be slighted in the historical record (Dafoe, Renshon, and 
Huth, 2014: 385). This insight suggests that a researcher should examine the period before a 
crisis when leaders are openly debating the credibility of an adversary.  
Third, there are weaknesses in the theoretical explanations that Mercer and Press offer to 
explain their counter-intuitive findings. Mercer theorizes that enemies cannot gain a re-
putation for irresolution because leaders attribute an enemy’s backing down to “situational” 
factors. This logic overlooks that a “situation” might, in the realm of international politics, 
span the months of a tense crisis or the entirety of a simmering international rivalry, times in 
which credibility is paramount. That leaders attribute backing down to “situational” factors 
should therefore provide cold comfort (Press, 2007). Press takes a different theoretical tack. 
He argues that leaders abandon “simple heuristics” like a state’s past actions when 
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calculating the credibility of an enemy during a crisis. He fails to explain, though, why a 
state’s past actions are a “simple” heuristic. Neither do the two psychology studies he relies 
on to bolster this theoretical inference explain why past actions can be categorized as simple 
information (Chaiken, 1980; Schwarz, 2002). Without this explanation the “simple 
heuristics” theory cannot explain his findings. 
Yarhi-Milo and Weisiger’s research also contains a noticeable shortcoming: no 
qualitative evidence about causal mechanisms. Despite robust statistical findings, these 
researchers do not present historical evidence of a leader considering an adversary’s past 
actions when calculating credibility. An in-depth, historical case would shed light on the 
“black box” of their statistical findings and potentially bolster the case for reputation’s 
importance. This paper aims to do just that. 
 
3.2 A Private Information Theory of Past Actions and Reputation 
 
Press holds that leaders assess their enemy’s military power and diplomatic resolve by 
solely evaluating their enemy’s military forces and the diplomatic behavior of their adversary. 
He contends that leaders therefore do not rely on their enemy’s past actions when estimating 
their adversary’s military power and resolve. 2  These methods, though, are less-than-
satisfying to foreign policy leaders. Estimating another state’s military power is fraught with 
uncertainty. Because there are many factors that determine combat outcomes and because 
combat is a relatively rare phenomenon, leaders are likely to believe that military assess-
ments that focus on the so-called military balance actually provide precious little information 
about the likely outcome of a crisis or war (Marshall, 1966). Similarly, another state’s recent 
diplomatic behavior will similarly prove frustrating to leaders engaged in determining the 
resolve of an enemy. This is because leaders will view much of their adversary’s diplomacy 
as “cheap talk”—claims that are not costly to the enemy and therefore lack credibility. 
Statesmen will worry, in other words, that their enemies have incentives to lie (Fearon, 1995). 
Diplomatic behavior could therefore be not only uninformative but deceptive. 
The inadequacy of these methods forces leaders to turn to past behavior to gauge their 
enemy. An enemy’s past actions in crises and wars reveal private information about how the 
adversary views its own military power and diplomatic stakes.3 To borrow an analogy from 
poker, past actions are “tells,” indicators of the strength of one’s hand, which here translates 
to a self-assessment of military power and resolve. Leaders are interested in how enemies 
perceive themselves; enemies presumably have some self-knowledge, potentially hidden 
from outsiders, and use this private information to make decisions about initiating risky 
international behavior. Leaders can therefore make inferences about an enemy using its past 
behavior, updating their prior beliefs about the might of an enemy’s military forces or the 
extent to which a competitor views an issue as vital. Leaders will therefore revise their 
beliefs about a state that has yielded in a previous crisis, inferring that the yielding state’s 
leaders either believe their military inadequate or the stakes too marginal to justify action. 
This “private information” theory and Press’s current calculus theory generate four 
hypotheses about the method by which leaders assess their enemy’s military power and 
diplomatic resolve. The first two hypotheses, borrowed from current calculus theory, place 
                                                           
2 Resolve refers to the stakes involved in a given crisis or war. A highly resolved state perceives its 
stakes in a given crisis as significant. 





primary importance on the contemporaneous information leaders can gather on the other 
state’s military and diplomatic positions. The military calculations hypothesis predicts that a 
leader trying to estimate an enemy’s military power will focus on current factors: counts of 
troops and weapons, the technical proficiency of the enemy’s weapons, the level of training, 
and the geography over which operations would unfold. The strength of interest hypothesis 
predicts that leaders will focus on current diplomatic behavior and statements to estimate the 
enemy’s diplomatic resolve, that is, the perceived stakes involved. Press’s current calculus 
theory claims  that these two variables wholly explain how states predict adversary behavior; 
leaders should use only arguments about a state’s current military power and diplomatic 
resolve when evaluating their enemy (Press, 2005). 
The next two hypotheses integrate past actions with the previous two hypotheses; these 
hypotheses are the novel contribution of Yarhi-Milo and Weisiger’s research and contradict 
the theoretical claims of Press’s current calculus theory (Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo, 2015). 
These hypotheses highlight the role that past actions play in providing private information to 
adversaries. The reputation for weakness and reputation for indifference hypotheses posit 
that a state’s past actions—its behavior in past crises and wars—will influence how a leader 
estimates an adversary’s military power and level of commitment. The reputation for 
weakness hypothesis focuses on past actions revealing information about military 
capabilities; the reputation for indifference hypothesis emphasizes past actions revealing 
information about a state’s diplomatic resolve, i.e. its perceived level of interest in a given 
situation. Of course, distinguishing between statements that support the reputation for 
weakness and the reputation for indifference hypotheses could be impossible; a leader might 
cite an enemy’s past actions when predicting future behavior but fail to specify whether that 
past action indicates military weakness or diplomatic fecklessness.   
Current calculus theory predicts that only the military calculations and strength of interest 
hypothesis will find support. The private information theory of reputation holds that the 
reputation for weakness and reputation for indifference hypotheses will find support.  
My methodology is straightforward.  Each case study tries to answer the question of what 
factors leaders consider when measuring the military power and diplomatic resolve of their 
enemies. In each case I group the type of evidence by hypothesis, linking particular state-
ments to the hypotheses examined in this paper. This research strategy therefore capitalizes 
on the comparative advantage of historical case studies in assessing causal mechanisms 
(Gerring, 2004: 348-9). While some readers might view this method as too simple for a 
modern social science paper, the method fits the task: assessing whether leaders rely on their 
adversaries reputation when estimating their enemy’s military power and resolve. Because 
reputation skeptics believe that leaders never consider a state’s past actions (i.e. it’s reput-
ation), providing archival evidence that leaders did in fact consider an enemy’s past action is 
sufficient to cast doubt on the central claim of reputation skeptics (Gerring, 2004: 349). 
This article tests these hypotheses with four cases from the Korean War. There are three 
case devoted to the pre-war period in which Joseph Stalin, Mao Zedong, and Kim Il-Sung 
considered the American response to an invasion of South Korea. The fourth case study 
examines U.S. policymakers as they consider the Chinese response to America’s crossing of 
the 38th parallel. The Korean War stands out not only for the richness of the historical record 
but because Jonathan Mercer has recently applied his argument to the Korean War, arguing 
that reputation played little role in that conflict (Mercer, 2013). I meet this argument on 
historical ground chosen by a skeptic of reputation to demonstrate the strength of the 
reputation for weakness and reputation for indifference hypotheses. The three pre-war case 
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studies also overcome the unspoken assumptions problem by investigating the perceptions of 
Kim Il-Sung, Stalin, and Mao (and their advisers) before their attitudes had crystallized into 
shared beliefs. This case intentionally tests the prediction by Yarhi-Milo and Weisiger and 
Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth that qualitative evidence for reputation will be more easily 
discoverable before a crisis starts (Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo, 2015: 478; Dafoe, Renshon, and 
Huth, 2014: 385). Because Kim Il-Sung, Stalin, and Mao initiated a surprise attack on South 
Korea, there was never a “crisis” before the invasion. The pre-war cases are therefore 
methodologically ideal to test for qualitative evidence of reputation.  
 
 
4. HISTORICAL CASE STUDIES 
 
4.1 Case One: Kim Il Sung and The Invasion of South Korea 
 
The leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Kim Il-Sung, desired, above 
all else, the unification of Korea in 1949-50. He spent these two years in a type of shuttle 
diplomacy, brokering not peace, but war, to be fought over control of the Korean peninsula. 
In these negotiations he revealed his views on American military power and resolve. As it 
turns out, Kim Il-Sung and other high-level North Korean officials did not fear American 
intervention, because, in their worldview, a mere “civil war” could not lead to armed conflict 
with the United States. 
Kim Il-Sung, inscrutable to American leaders in 1950, appears less so in retrospect, at 
least when examining the narrow question of what he believed about America’s military 
strength and diplomatic interests and the likely American response to a unification attempt. 
USSR diplomatic telegrams report that in the summer of 1949 the North Koreans argued to 
their communist allies that in the case of “a civil war in Korea” the United States would 
decline to intervene (Shen, 2013: 122). North Koreans not only viewed American inter-
vention as improbable but actually thought “that Synghman Rhee would capitulate.” A North 
Korean People’s Army General from the period, Chung Sang Chin, when interviewed, 
claimed that he and others strongly believed “the Americans would not intervene” 
(Goncharov, Lewis, and Litai, 1993: 155). The North Koreans, this section argues, believed 
in U.S. passivity because of military-operational reasons and perceived fecklessness and 
apathy. This first case study contradicts Press’s current calculus theory; North Korean 
leaders cite past American actions when estimating U.S. military strength and foreign policy 
interests. North Korean leaders also relied on assessments of America’s contemporaneous 
military posture and diplomatic interests. 
 
4.1.1 Past U.S. Actions in the Chinese Civil War 
Reputation mattered, as archival evidence attests, since Kim and other North Korean 
elites based their estimates of U.S. interests on past U.S. actions, specifically its lackluster 
support for the Chinese Nationalists in the late 1940’s. The record overflows with Chinese, 
Soviet, and Korean references to U.S. inactivity in the Chinese Civil War. The evidence links 
North Korean calculations to the reputation for indifference hypothesis. 
An NKPA General explains the reasoning that was prevalent before the invasion: 
 
“the Americans would never participate in the war. We were absolutely sure in this... The 
argument was the following: the Americans had not participated in the civil war in China. 





participate in such a small war on the Korean peninsula” [Emphasis added] (Goncharov et al., 
1993: 141). 
 
The general clearly points to past U.S. inaction—that the United States “had not 
participated in the civil war in China”—in order to estimate American resolve. America, 
according to this logic, showed so little interest in the Chinese Civil War that it could only be 
expected to show even less interest in this “small war.” A Soviet diplomat who was close to 
Soviet-North Korean talks claims, “After October 1949, the Koreans were inspired by the 
Chinese victory and by the fact that the Americans had fled from mainland China 
completely” (Goncharov et al., 1993: 138). Kim himself is paraphrased as saying, “They [the 
United States] left China without fighting; the same approach can be expected in Korea” 
(Weathersby, 2002). These remarks support the reputation for indifference hypothesis, 
demonstrating that past U.S. inaction informed North Korean estimates of American resolve 
in a future conflict. 
 
4.1.2 The Role of Military Calculations 
Kim Il-Sung amassed his military power over the 1949-50 period, gladly receiving 
weapons shipments from Stalin and welcoming home tens of thousands of battle-hardened 
Koreans who had fought in Mao’s army during the Chinese Civil War. In comparison to the 
poorly trained and ill-equipped army of Synghman Rhee, the president of South Korea, the 
North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) was an impressive war machine. Kim even thought it 
unnecessary to wait for U.S. troops to leave South Korea before beginning an invasion, 
believing that North Korea, with the aid of Stalin, could overcome whatever the resistance of 
the capitalist world (Stueck, 2004: 70). Once the United States did withdraw its troops in 
summer 1949, Kim Il-Sung likely appraised the military balance as even more tilted in the 
NKPA’s favor, suggesting to Stalin that he share this favorable assessment in the wake of 
U.S. withdrawal (Stueck, 2004: 70). Kim Il-Sung also counted among North Korea’s advan-
tages a strong guerilla presence in the South, which would erupt into a “major uprising” if he 
invaded South Korea (Weathersby, 2002). He calculated, “200,000 South Korean communist 
party members would join the fight and South Korean partisans would aid the People’s 
Army” (Shen, 2013: 122). Additionally, Kim also likely counted on the deterrent effect of 
the Soviet-Chinese alliance to hold the Americans at bay (Goncharov et al., 1993: 142). 
Kim, after tabulating these advantages, arrived at a conclusion that would eventually 
produce an invasion: a North Korean attack would result in “victory within days” (Shen, 
2013: 122). Kim predicted that the aggregate advantages of the North would allow a 
lightning victory, a Korean blitzkrieg, and the United States had no part in this calculation. 
According to Kim Il-Sung’s interpreter, who was present in Spring1950 when Kim met with 
Stalin, Kim justified his belief in U.S. inaction by positing, “the United States would have no 
time to prepare” (Shen, 2013: 122). Kim, then, rested his argument largely on a military 
assessment: North Korean forces were strong; Southern supporters would rise up in rebellion 
against the Rhee government; and the Americans, even if they desired to intervene, faced a 
fait accompli. The weight of available historical evidence therefore suggests that military 
calculations loomed large in Kim Il-Sung’s calculus when evaluating possible American 
military intervention. 
This section warrants a small, but important, cautionary note. The reader should know 
that the mass of evidence presented above can be traced to the many conversations and 
telegrams between Stalin and Kim from Spring 1949 to Summer 1950. These interactions 
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were part of the shuttle diplomacy in which Kim tried to convince Stalin of the merits of 
invading South Korea, which suggests to the author that Kim likely crafted his arguments for 
Stalin’s consumption, proposing rationales for war that would appease Stalin’s skepticism. 
Given that Kim Il-Sung might only have advanced these arguments to convince Stalin, the 
actual importance of military calculations to Kim Il-Sung is open to question. Without the 
opening of the North Korean archives, we must rely on Chinese and Russian sources, which 
will inevitably reflect North Korean preferences through the prism of these countries’ 
relationships with North Korea. 
 
4.1.3 Strength of Interest Hypothesis 
The evidence provides only a modicum of support for the “strength of interest” 
hypothesis—that the United States insufficiently demarcated the true extent of its national 
interests. A single confirming statement from a then-senior North Korea official provides the 
sole piece of evidence. He recalls that after the infamous Truman and Acheson speeches of 
January 1950, Kim “was convinced that the U.S. would not enter the Korean war” 
(Goncharov et al., 1993: 142). Despite the plausibility of this claim, we should be skeptical 
of memories recollected forty years after the fact, especially memories that are consistent 
with popular narratives that could have seeped into the unconscious of first-hand observers 
(Loftus, 2005: 361-366). 
 
4.1.4 Case One Summary 
Press’s current calculus theory takes its first blow in this section. Current calculus theory 
predicts that leaders will never use their enemy’s past actions when calculating their enemy’s 
military power and diplomatic resolve. The private information theory of reputation, 
however, predicts that leaders will indeed use their enemy’s past action when assessing their 
enemy. North Korean leaders clearly did use American inaction in the Chinese civil war to 
gauge American diplomatic interests in the international politics of East Asia, lending 
support to the reputation for indifference hypothesis. Of course, current calculus theory 
correctly predicted that North Korean leaders would also assess the contemporary military 
balance and the diplomatic actions of the United States.  
 
4.2 Case Two: Stalin Ponders War 
 
Joseph Stalin, in the setting of early Cold War Asian politics, played the role of the 
Communist godfather, in contrast to Kim Il-Sung, who occupied the position of supplicant. 
No matter how determined Kim was to reunite the Koreas, because of North Korean 
dependence on Soviet aid, both economic and military, the ultimate decision rested on Stalin, 
and also Mao, who will be covered in the next section. Stalin coolly calculated the balance 
sheet for war, at first cautioning Kim against any rash action, but, eventually, supplying the 
war matériel and the approval necessary for an invasion. The eventual endorsement of Kim’s 
plan was, at least partially, predicated on Stalin’s views about the likelihood of American 
intervention. Stalin gradually altered his expectations from definite American entrance to 
unlikely but possible entrance.  
Shen Zhihua argues, “If Stalin had thought the Soviet decision would lead to U.S. 
intervention in Korea, things likely would have turned out completely differently” (Shen, 
2013: 121). In the spring of 1950, available evidence illuminates a change in Stalin’s 





North Korean invasion, and presumably a changed view of American involvement under-
pinned this new “international situation” (Shen, 2013: 121). But before this transformation, 
Stalin and his subordinates had consistently displayed extreme caution in predicting the 
American response. Terentii Shtykov, the Soviet Ambassador to North Korea, worried that 
the United States “might use the occasion of a major North Korean offensive to a launch a 
major international campaign against the USSR” (Christensen, 2011: 49). Lee Jang Jo, then 
the North Korean Ambassador to the Soviet Union, has also revealed that Stalin worried 
about American intervention (Goncharov et al., 1993: 139). Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei 
Gromyko and Defense Minister Nikolai Bulganin also fretted that America, to borrow 
Khrushchev’s phrase, might “jump in,” writing that “the Americans will certainly move their 
troops into South Korea” (Stueck, 2004: 36; Weathersby, 2002: 15). What explains Stalin’s 
calculations, both in his pre-January 1950 cautious phase and his later more risk-acceptant 
phase? His explanation of American behavior rested largely on the military balance. 
Contrary to current calculus theory, however, Stalin also employed arguments about 
American resolve and about how America’s past actions indicated future weakness. Stalin 
clearly viewed past American actions as revelations of private information about American 
military weakness. 
 
4.2.1 Stalin’s Military Calculations 
That military calculations can explain both Stalin’s early caution and his 1950 approval 
of Kim’s attack suggests the centrality of military considerations in Stalin’s thinking. His 
initial reticence can be traced to the continued presence of American troops in South Korea, 
while his later warming to Kim’s invasion plan can be attributed to a heady assessment of the 
invasion’s prospects and a belief in the deterrent effects of atomic weapons. 
When Kim first tried to sell Stalin on Korean unification in the spring of 1949, Stalin 
balked, citing, among other reasons, the presence of American troops in the South 
(Weathersby, 2002). Even the withdrawal of American troops did not fully alleviate Soviet 
concerns about American intervention; Shtykov, in fall of 1949, warned Stalin that a North 
Korean strike might result in American interference, “not only by supplying the South with 
weapons and ammunition, but also by sending Japanese troops to its [South Korea’s] 
support” (Weathersby, 2002: 6-7). The Politburo, the central governing body of the Soviet 
Union, also called for caution in response to Kim’s request for assistance. Fearful that an 
invasion might stall and provide an opportunity for the United States to enter the conflict, the 
Politburo cautioned against military action by the North (Weathersby, 1995: 8). The Soviet 
government, additionally, did not share, at least in 1949, Kim’s assessment of the potential 
for a lightning-fast victory; Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Defense Minister 
Nikolai Bulganin, in a memo to Stalin about Kim’s unification proposals, flatly declared that 
Kim Il- Sung “cannot even defeat the South Korean arm” (Weathersby, 2002: 7-8). Despite 
the widespread Soviet caution seen in 1949, a host of developments altered Stalin’s 
calculations over the winter of 1949-50, culminating in Stalin’s late January 1950 approval 
of Kim’s plan to reunify Korea. 
What tipped the scales in Kim’s favor? While we cannot place exact weights on each 
component of the decision, we can surmise that a quick victory mindset and the Soviet’s 
atomic breakout, among other factors, contributed to Stalin’s approval. Sergei Goncharov et 
al. seize on a key Soviet decision that provides evidence of this belief in the possibility of a 
lightning victory by Kim. The invasion battle plan, which was initially drafted by the Soviet 
military, foresaw the occupation of Seoul within four days of combat, a widespread uprising 
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in the South, and a total victory within a month (Goncharov et al., 1993: 152). In the mind of 
Stalin, this plan survived contact with the enemy by avoiding contact in the first place. 
Victory had to be swift, so that, in Stalin’s own words, the Americans lacked “time to put up 
a strong resistance and to mobilize international support” (Stueck, 2004: 74).  
The end of the American nuclear monopoly also freed Stalin’s hand. Stalin viewed the 
United States as “more hesitant to challenge the Communists in Asia” after the USSR 
acquired the nuclear bomb in late 1949 (Weathersby, 2002: 11). This American hesitancy, 
according to Stalin, was only compounded by the Sino-Soviet Treaty, recently signed, which 
demonstrated the strength of the Communist bloc, thereby deterring the United States from 
interference in mainland affairs (Weathersby, 2002: 11). Stalin gambled on military grounds 
that the United States would avoid a fight in a South Korea, but his calculations were not 
solely military. 
 
4.2.2 America’s Damaged Reputation 
Stalin, like Kim Il-Sung, also viewed America’s response to the Chinese Civil War as 
evidence of American weakness. That Stalin used America’s reputation to predict the 
American response to a North Korean unification attempt hangs on a key quotation—Stalin 
proclaiming that the Chinese Civil War “has proved the strength of Asian revolutionaries, 
and shown the weakness of Asian reactionaries and their mentors in the West, in America. 
Americans left China and did not dare to challenge the new Chinese authorities militarily” 
(Weathersby, 2002: 11). Stalin references a past U.S. action, the United States “leaving” 
China, and then claims that such inaction demonstrates the “weakness” of America. Stalin 
finally claims that such American inaction is “psychologically important,” all in the context 
of a spring 1950 conversation with Kim-Il Sung in which Kim and Stalin are consummating 
the decision to invade South Korea (Stueck, 2004: 73). That Stalin used American past 
actions to estimate America’s military power, given the evidence above, appears undeniable. 
 
4.2.3 America Sends Mixed Signals 
Before the U.S. troop withdrawal and prior to the infamous Acheson and Truman 
speeches of January 1950, Stalin consistently cautioned Kim against unification because of 
clear American signals—a U.S. troop presence and the perceived sanctity of the 38th parallel 
suggested a strong American interest in the status quo. After the withdrawal and the Truman 
and Acheson speeches, though, Stalin changed his opinion and began to doubt America’s 
commitment to South Korea. 
The U.S. presence in South Korea originally functioned as a trip-wire, signaling to friend 
and foe alike a tangible commitment to South Korea. Stalin explicitly recognized that 
American troops nearly guaranteed American “interference” in the case of conflict (Stueck, 
2004: 112). Shtykov, the Soviet Ambassador to North Korea, also focused on American 
signaling, stating, that because “South Korea has been recognized by the USA and other 
countries,” the United States would not sit idly by in the face of North Korean aggression 
(Weathersby, 2002: 6-7). Stalin, according to William Stueck, further feared that the de facto 
agreement between the USSR and the United States on the 38th parallel meant that any 
North Korean violation of that boundary would provoke an American response, since 
Americans would view a breach of the parallel as evidence of Soviet perfidy (Stueck, 2004: 
70). 
Stalin then dramatically switched his view on America’s commitment when U.S. signal-





meter speech, which drew an East Asian defense perimeter that left the Korean peninsula 
outside the perimeter, Stalin no longer saw evidence of clear American signaling, but, 
instead, saw evidence that America had signaled a notable lack of interest in Korean affairs 
(Shen, 2013: 122). To prove that Stalin perceived a switch in American signaling, scholars 
refer to Stalin’s oft-quoted April 1950 remark that “the prevailing [American] mood is not to 
interfere,” which he attributed to unspecified “information coming from the United States” 
(Stueck, 2004: 73). While what “information” Stalin was referring to remains unclear, 
circumstantial evidence permits informed speculation that Stalin had listened to the Truman 
speech with keen interest and had obtained a copy of NSC-48, a closely held American 
document that had excluded Korea from the American defense perimeter (Shen, 2013: 122; 
Weathersby, 2002: 1). American signaling therefore both deterred Stalin, protecting South 
Korea, and, eventually, encouraged Stalin, when American pronouncements signaled a lack 
of U.S. interest in the fate of Korea. 
 
4.2.4 Case Two Summary 
Press’s current calculus again mis-predicts a key aspect of this case. Stalin singled out 
past American actions when appraising American military power. In accordance with the 
logic of the reputation for weakness hypothesis, past American actions provided private 
information to Stalin about America’s martial strength and diplomatic interests. Military 
calculations and diplomatic actions nonetheless also figured prominently in Stalin’s thinking, 
which bolsters current calculus theory’s emphasis on military power and diplomatic resolve. 
 
4.3 Case Three: Mao, The United States, and a “Small Piece of Territory” 
 
The People’s Republic of China (PRC), which features prominently in the combat history 
of the Korean War, until recently occupied a peripheral role in the lead-up to the Korean War. 
Conventional historiography describes Mao as an accomplice who was dragged into the 
Korean War upon America’s counterattack. Mao, in this narrative, gave his approval to Kim 
Il- Sung for Kim’s invasion of South Korea, but the approval was given unwillingly, since 
Mao viewed Kim’s “request” as a fait accompli. Recent research, however, has recast Mao as 
a key figure in the pre-Korean War buildup, wielding veto power over Kim’s bellicose plans 
(Christensen, 2011). From this research, we can glean that Mao actually shared a key 
assumption with Kim and Stalin—that the United States was unlikely to intervene—and that 
the Chinese perception of American indifference and weakness can account for Mao’s 
endorsement of Kim’s plan. Current calculus theory outperforms its competitor in this case. 
 
4.3.1 Limited American Interests 
The paper trail from early 1950 indicates that Mao Zedong believed American interests 
too insignificant to justify an American intervention. When discussing a possible invasion 
with Kim, Mao reportedly said that United States would not “launch World War III over 
such a small piece of territory” (Christensen, 2011: 58). Even though this statement should 
be treated with caution, since it was reported by North Korean diplomats seeking to 
downplay any Chinese concerns to the Soviets a, the “small piece of territory” addendum 
bears repeating, especially since this statement by Mao dovetails with another: “the USA, 
perhaps, would not be involved, because this was an internal question that would be solved 
by the Korean people themselves” (Goncharov et al., 1993: 143). The scope of the conflict in 
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Korea therefore, according to Mao, would not concern Americans. American non-
intervention, then, was assured, on the grounds that the U.S. stakes were too small. 
 
4.3.2 Chinese Views of America’s Military 
Mao believed a theory of warfare that denigrated America’s military, which explains his 
belief that North Korea (and later China) could defeat the American superpower. In parti-
cular, Mao believed that a determined army of men could defeat even the most tech-
nologically advanced enemy (Twomey, 2010). One scholar has called this system of beliefs 
“military romanticism (Zhang, 1995). This belief stemmed from the long Communist fight 
against both the Nationalists and Japan. The Communist success convinced Mao that an 
audacious weaker power could defeat materially powerful enemies, even the United Sates 
(Kennedy, 2013: 17). “We [the Chinese] have experienced decades of war,” Mao once 
boasted “Didn’t we beat enemies with superior equipment in all of them” (Kennedy, 2013: 
34).  
 
4.3.3 Case Three Summary 
This case conforms to the predictions of current calculus theory. Mao did factor in 
current military and diplomatic calculations. There is no historical evidence that he focused 
on past U.S. actions.  
 
4.4 Case Four: The Truman Administration Eyes China 
 
From June 25th 1950, the day North Korean tanks first rumbled across the 38th parallel, 
to the Chinese counter-intervention of the late fall, the Truman administration vigorously 
debated possible Chinese reactions to U.S. fighting. The administration, relying on 
assessments of a favorable military balance and China’s non-response to American actions, 
eventually decided that China would sit the Korean War out. In this section I document 
American calculations about Chinese military power and resolve. Current calculus theory 
fails its fourth test in a row. American decision-makers incorporated recent Chinese actions 
into their assessments of Chinese power and interests.  
 
4.4.1 Will China Pull Others’ Chestnuts Out of the Fire? 
Opinions on how China would react to the U.S. crossing the 38th parallel varied widely 
within the administration. Both John Foster Dulles and Dean Acheson erred on the side of 
caution, warning against facile claims of Chinese indifference. Acheson claimed the United 
States would be “lucky” if the Chinese did not intervene (FRUS, Fourth Meeting: 746). 
Dulles echoed this worry in a September memo and also even included the Soviets as 
potential combatants, writing: 
 
“We cannot know whether it will be possible to unify Korea by United Nations action 
localized to Korea. That would involve an extension the Soviet Union would regard as US 
influence...into areas very close to Port Arthur and Vladivostok...Any effort which seemed to 
imply this result might be met by Chinese Communist and Soviet force” (FRUS, Dulles: 751; 
Zhang, 1992: 81). 
 
Not all voices counseled caution. A September 1950 National Security Council report 
about the course of the war concluded that China would not enter the fight (Goncharov et al., 





the Indian Ambassador to Beijing (FRUS, Henderson: 742). The U.S. General Consul to 
Hong Kong felt similarly, since he had intelligence that Zhou Enlai, Beijing’s Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, had stated that China would not intervene unless attacked (FRUS, 
Wilkinson: 765). While these diplomats expressed skepticism towards a direct Chinese 
response, MacArthur, then the Commander of United Nations forces, expressly rejected the 
possibility of Chinese intervention (Stueck, 2004: 112). When the Western forces eventually 
crossed the 38th parallel, the dominant perspective on Chinese reactions was closer to that of 
MacArthur’s than Dulles’s. 
 
4.4.2 Why Chinese Weakness Precluded Chinese Involvement 
MacArthur also thought, however, that even if China did intervene, American forces 
would trounce their ill-equipped foes, owing in large part to American airpower (Stueck, 
2004: 112). Such a calculation, largely military in nature, accounts for much, though not all, 
of the force behind the American conviction that China would not intervene. To American 
observers, China’s technological inferiority and its apparent lack of military preparations 
ineluctably led to the conclusion that Chinese intervention would be “sheer madness” (Zhang, 
1992: 84). 
The Americans and Chinese saw military power through wildly different lenses, which 
lulled the Americans into a false sense of security (Twomey, 2010). American policymakers 
belittled the Chinese military, as seen in an American intelligence report that “Communist 
Chinese forces had been primarily based on hit-and-run guerilla tactics, and that their 
soldiers had never met with a well-trained forced with high morale equipped with modern 
weapons” (Zhang, 1992: 85). Hong Kong Consul General James Wilkinson seconded such 
an assessment. The Chinese, Wilkinson argued, will be “unable to cope with UN airpower” 
(Zhang, 1992: 86). In short, Americans believed Chinese military weakness precluded 
Chinese entrance into the war (Christensen, 1996: 151). 
Furthermore, American policymakers viewed the perceived lack of Chinese military 
preparation as evidence that China would not intervene. The American Ambassador to India 
reported that the Chinese were not even preparing air defenses over the capital city, Beijing, 
let alone other military measures that would necessarily foreshadow a Chinese entrance into 
the Korean War (FRUS, Henderson: 742). Another high level American meeting also noted 
the lack of civilian precaution in major Chinese cities, interpreting such inaction as revealing 
of benign Chinese intentions (FRUS, Austin: 760). Military calculations therefore led the 
United States policymakers to predict Chinese acquiescence. 
 
4.4.3 Limited Chinese Interests 
American policymakers viewed Mao’s China as not only militarily frail but as strate-
gically disinclined to intervene. Dean Acheson, James Wilkinson, and other government 
figures believed many countervailing forces discouraged Chinese intervention. An ailing 
economy, a rivalry with the Soviets, and limited defensive objectives would, according to 
American thinking, keep the People’s Liberation Army at bay and out of the Korean conflict. 
Wilkinson cabled Washington with a report that the Chinese focus on reconstruction in 
the aftermath of the Chinese Civil War meant Mao would avoid a fight in Korea (FRUS, 
Wilkinson: 765). A CIA analysis concurred, pointing to both domestic strains on the 
economy that war would impose but also the threat of internal problems should a Chinese 
intervention fail (Zhang, 1992: 84-85). Dean Acheson also speculated that Chinese interests 
might not be sufficient to justify an intervention, since “their [the Chinese] great problem is 
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with Soviet domination along their northern border” (Zhang, 1992: 84). George Kennan 
agreed with Acheson, but emphasized not rivalry, but lack of cooperation. Since there 
existed no evidence that Mao and Stalin had concluded an agreement on Korea, Kennan 
believed Mao would be loath to commit troops against American forces (Zhang, 1992: 84). 
Finally, Chinese objectives were limited, even if their interests were broader—the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff determined that Chinese objectives were the safeguarding of the Chinese 
border and guarding of nearby power complexes (Cohen and Gooch, 2006: 170). Chinese 
intervention, therefore, was extremely unlikely given the limited stakes that American 
officials believed China had in a Korean conflict. 
 
4.4.4 Military Signaling and Reputation 
The American calculation that the PRC would not intervene flowed from one last 
American perception: that the prime chance for Chinese intervention had passed, which 
indicated that China had declined to intervene, which signaled that Mao either thought China 
too weak or Korea too insignificant to justify a Chinese intervention (Christensen, 2011: 21). 
The lack of Chinese response both during the American intervention and operations at Pusan 
and after the American landing at Inchon indicated to American policymakers that China 
would not intervene. Therefore, as predicted by the logic of past actions theory, previous 
Chinese decisions revealed private information to the Americans—that China either lacked 
sufficient military power or a large enough national interest. 
A report from MacArthur’s intelligence officer offers strong affirmative evidence. The 
intelligence officer wrote, “The auspicious time for [Chinese] intervention has long since 
passed” (Twomey, 2010: 109). Similarly a report from John P. Davies of the Policy Planning 
Staff states that the Chinese had “declined to snatch the chestnut from the fire.” (FRUS, 
Davies: 753) American officials watched Chinese actions closely after American intervene-
tion and when no military significant Chinese reaction occurred, U.S. officials deduced that 
China would not intervene (Christensen, 2011: 21). What the American policymakers failed 
to realize was that the uncoordinated Communist alliance and the plodding nature of military 
preparation meant that China intended to intervene, but had not sufficiently laid the 
groundwork for intervention (Cohen and Gooch, 2006: 171; Christensen, 2011: 28-109) 
Once again, the evidence does not allow one to adjudicate between the reputation for 
weakness and reputation for indifference hypotheses. 
 
4.4.5 Case Four Summary 
Current calculus theory receives its final blow here. It mis-predicts the absence of 
evidence for the importance of past actions, though it correctly identifies current military and 
diplomatic factors as salient in American decision-making. The competitor theory that 
conceptualizes past actions as private information, however, correctly predicts that American 
leaders would interpret a Chinese decision to not intervene as evidence of Chinese military 
weakness or diplomatic indifference.  
 
 
5. ADDRESSING COUNTER-ARGUMENTS 
 
There are several reasonable objections to this project’s methodology. This section tries 
to allay these concerns. 





tests four hypotheses on four cases. This methodological flaw would preclude the project 
from drawing valid inferences. My intent, however, was not to perform the qualitative 
equivalent of a regression, determining the independent effect of each independent variable 
on the outcome. This project’s goal was simpler: to answer the question of what factors 
leaders consider when measuring the military power and diplomatic resolve of their enemies. 
This approach was meant to test whether the theoretical causal mechanisms of current 
calculus theory and private information theory are operating as predicted. Reputation 
skeptics hold an absolutist view that under no circumstances do leaders consider another 
state's past actions. All my project had to do was enumerate the types of arguments used by 
leaders during the Korean War when sizing up their enemy. I found evidence that leaders 
considered military calculations, recent diplomatic behavior, and a state’s past actions. This 
paper’s evidence for that last factor, a state’s past actions, undermines the claim that leaders 
do not ever consider an enemy’s past actions. That there were four separate hypotheses and 
only four cases is therefore unimportant. 
Second, a critic might also worry about the conceptualization of the dependent variable. 
My study’s outcome was the factors leader consider when measuring the military power and 
diplomatic resolve of their enemy. Others can rightfully ask why I did not focus on arguably 
more “important” outcomes such as what sort of behavior a leader predicts of its enemy or 
breakdowns in deterrence, that is, an actual outcome of international politics. These other 
outcomes are interesting and worthwhile, but I leave them to other studies. I wanted to test a 
core element of the reputation skeptics’ theoretical chain of logic. Press and Mercer theorize 
that enemies cannot gain a bad reputation, which means that deterrence will never break 
down for reasons of reputation, that leaders will not predict an enemy's future behavior on 
the basis of past actions, and, importantly, that leaders will not use past actions to assess their 
enemy’s military power and resolve. I decided to focus on this last implication because it 
must theoretically precede the others. If the historical record shows even some consideration 
of past actions when a leader is calculating an enemy’s credibility, then the current calculus 
theory fails a basic test. After such a failure, and this project tried to demonstrate several, 
there is no need to move onto other, more “real-world” outcomes. 
Third, some readers could believe that this article presents too broad a conception of 
“past actions.” Past research often narrowly defines past actions as explicit threats that a 
leader then either fulfills or neglects. This paper broadens the definition. I defined past 
actions as all behavior by a given state in past crises and wars, including decisions to avoid 
entering a crisis or war. Leaders need not issue explicit threats to gain a reputation in this 
article’s framework. Critics might therefore contend that my argument is tangential to the 
traditional reputation debate because of the supposedly over-broad definition. These critics 
miss that my definition actually includes explicit threats, though my cases did not focus on 
them. Explicit threats, whether unfulfilled or not, are one example of a past action. 
Furthermore, that the Korean War cases do not define past actions as explicit threats yet still 
find evidence for reputation suggests that explicit yet unfulfilled threats are even more likely 
to damage a state’s reputation. For instance, the Chinese inaction after U.N. forces crossed 
the 38th parallel would have done even more damage to China’s reputation if Mao had 
previously issued an explicit threat that China would certainly intervene if U.N. forces 
crossed into North Korea. That China’s reputation was damaged anyway suggests the 
influence of all past actions, whether an explicit threat was issued or not. 
Fourth, even a reader who concedes that I present evidence of leaders employing an 
enemy’s past actions to judge credibility might dispute my proposed causal mechanism. I 
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suggest that leaders view past actions as a source of “private information,” information 
previously known only by the enemy that then provides a valuable window into how the 
enemy perceives its own military power and how the enemy assesses the extent of its 
diplomatic interests. Leaders then fold this no-longer-private information into their estimate 
of the enemy. This reader would correctly point out that this process is mostly unobservable. 
My defense is two-fold. First, the Truman case study does show leaders in real-time updating 
their beliefs about Chinese power and resolve as China appeared to decline to intervene after 
U.N. forces crossed the 38th parallel. This is exactly my theoretical claim. The other cases, 
though, provide little direct insight into this causal logic. Second, a theory with 
“unobservables” is nearly a redundant phrasing. Most grand theories of international 
relations have unobservables. My more modest theory is no exception. In principle, I support 
developing theories that can be falsified, including by attempting to observe the implications 
of a theory. Some implications are difficult to discern, however. Leaders updating their 
beliefs when they acquire private information is such an implication. Future case study 
researchers should scrutinize their cases for this logic. 
Fifth, a reader might wonder how strong a theory of reputation my cases and evidence 
support. Past scholars have sought to debunk “strong” theories of reputation—that past 
irresolution in one region with a particular set of actors will lead different actors in a 
different region to doubt that same state’s future credibility. This paper took the opposite 
approach. I have argued for a “weak” theory of reputation. The case studies from the Korean 
War all involve the same actors in the same geographic region interacting over a short time 
period. Reputation matters, but this evidence from the Korean War can only attest to past 
actions mattering within a short time-frame over similar issues in the same region. Leaders 





Despite these caveats, the argument within still mounts a challenge to the policy 
prescriptions of reputation skeptics, who maintain that a leader need only to amass military 
strength and demarcate clear, credible red lines in order to issue credible threats. The 
evidence from the Korean War, summarized in table 2, supports Mercer’s emphasis on 
military power and resolve, but reveals a missing element: past actions. Standing firm in past 
crises can signal the strength of a state’s military and the importance of a particular 
commitment, revealing otherwise private information. The skeptics therefore underestimate 
the costs of backing down in past crises.  
Past researchers failed to find evidence in support of reputation because they focused 
their analytical gaze solely on crises, falling into the “unspoken assumptions” trap. In a crisis 
leaders have likely already calculated in another state’s past actions into their estimates of 
that state’s military strength and resolve. This paper therefore selected three pre-crisis cases 
and a fourth crisis case, the Truman Administration’s assessment of China. Two of the three 
pre-crisis cases contained evidence that leaders use past actions to assess their enemy. The 
crisis case, surprisingly, also revealed evidence of leaders linking past actions to current 
estimates of the enemy. 
Future researchers have many more cases to unpack, theories to design, and policy 
problems to attack. Those interested in additional historical case studies should head for the 





Table 2. Summary of Results from Case Studies  










Case 1: Kim Il-Sung × ×  × 
Case 2: Stalin × × ×  
Case 3: Mao × ×  
Case 4: Truman × × ×* 
* Indicates that the evidence could not differentiate between two hypotheses. 
 
 
mechanisms underlying the theory presented in this article. Saddam Hussein’s decision-
making before the First Gulf War, for instance, could be a potential case study for the 
enterprising researcher willing to examine the records of the Conflict Records Research 
Center, a U.S. National Defense University archival project that maintains documents 
captured during the Second Gulf War. Recent research reveals that Saddam Hussein 
delivered a speech prior to invading Kuwait in which he said, “we saw that the United States, 
as a superpower, departed Lebanon immediately when some Marines were killed” (Woods, 
2008: 52). This quotation is suggestive but requires further investigation. 
Scholars must also begin theorizing about reputation in a more detailed way. Does a state, 
a regime, or a leader gain a reputation? How long does a reputation last? Does a reputation 
gained on one issue carry over to vastly different issues? Can a state repair a damaged 
reputation?  
Finally, researchers engaged in reputation research owe it to diplomats and strategists to 
incorporate their findings into advice on the conduct of foreign affairs. For example, my 
findings suggest that a state’s past actions do inform the decision-making of adversaries, 
revealing private information about a state’s military strength and foreign policy interests. 
The implication, to take one example, is that U.S. diplomats should therefore calculate this 
cost into any deliberation over U.S. policy towards Taiwan. An American decision to stay 
neutral in a China-Taiwan conflict could damage America’s reputation in the eyes of China’s 
leadership. Chinese leaders could interpret such a decision as evidence that either the 
American military has become too weak to defend what were previously U.S. interests in the 
Pacific or that U.S. diplomatic priorities have changed. Chinese leaders might become less 
deterred by U.S. security guarantees to Japan or the Philippines and more willing to assert 
Chinese interests. In short, reputation matters.  
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